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Abstract— Humans often make irrational decisions, especially
psychiatric patients who have dysfunctional cognitive and
emotional circuitry. Understanding the neural basis of decision-
making is therefore essential towards patient management,
yet current studies suffer from several limitations. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in humans have
dominated decision-making neuroscience, but have poor tem-
poral resolution and the blood oxygenation level-dependent
signal is only a proxy for neural activity. On the other hand,
lesion studies in humans used to infer functionality in decision-
making lack characterization of neural activity altogether.
Using a combination of local field potential recordings in human
subjects performing a financial decision-making task, spectral
analyses, and non-parametric cluster statistics, we analyzed the
activity in the precuneus. In nine subjects, the neural activity
modulated significantly between rational and irrational trials
in the precuneus (p < 0.001). In particular, high-frequency
activity (70–100 Hz) increased when irrational decisions were
made. Although preliminary, these results suggest suppression
of gamma rhythms via electrical stimulation in the precuneus
as a therapeutic intervention for pathological decision-making.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decision-making links cognition to behavior and is a key
driver of human personality, fundamental for survival, and
essential for our ability to learn and adapt. It has been well-
established that humans often make irrational decisions [1].
Thus, psychiatric patients who have dysfunctional cognitive
circuitry, frequently have alterations in decision-making that
are poorly understood.
Understanding the neural basis of decision-making is
therefore essential toward patient management. However,
access to the human brain has been limited to a few case
studies wherein subjects have lesions in the key decision-
making structures such as the orbital frontal cortex [2]–[4],
or wherein functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
is used to measure neural activity in several healthy subjects
during decision-making [5]. Both of these approaches have
limitations. Lesions don’t provide actual neural data to ascer-
tain a specific brain regions’s role during behavior. Rather,
the region’s function is inferred by absence of behaviors
from lesioned subjects when compared to healthy subjects.
On the other hand, fMRI provides a correlate of neural
P. Sacre´ and S. V. Sarma are with the Institute for Computational
Medicine and the Department of Biomedical Engineering, The Johns Hop-
kins University, Baltimore, MD (p.sacre@jhu.edu, sree@jhu.edu).
M. S. D. Kerr is with the Department of Engineering, University of
Cambridge, UK. S. Subramanian is with the Department of Clinical Neu-
rosciences, University of Cambridge, UK. K. Kahn is with Insight Data
Science, Palo Alto, CA. J. Gonzalez-Martinez, M. A. Johnson and J. T. Gale
are with the Institute for Computational Medicine and the Department of
Neurosciences, Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, OH (galej@ccf.org).
activity (metabolic activity) but suffers from poor temporal
resolution. fMRI resolution is on the order of multiple
seconds, while decisions are often made on the order of
tenths of a second.
Here, we took advantage of a technique called stereo-
electroencephalography (SEEG) that allowed us to record
high temporal resolution electrophysiological data (electrical
activity at the millisecond scale) directly from deep and
peripheral brain regions in human subjects while they per-
formed a gambling-based decision task. These subjects are
implanted with electrodes for clinical purposes, and each
contact in the brain generates a local field potential signal.
For our gambling task, nine subjects played a game of
high card where they won virtual money if their card was
higher than the computer’s card. On each trial, subjects
had to decide to bet “high” ($20) or “low” ($5) on their
card being higher than the hidden computer’s card. Eighty
percent of the trials lead to clear rational decisions where
the expected reward for one choice is higher than another.
On twenty percent of the trials, however, there is no clear
rational decision since the expected reward is equal for both
choices. Here, we focussed on scenarios where subjects made
choices that would minimize their expected reward even in
scenarios where the risk of losing was low. We denote these
decisions as “irrational”. The goal of the study is to assess
the role of different brain regions in driving these irrational
decisions.
To identify neural correlates that drive irrational behav-
ior, we computed spectrograms for each brain region (i.e.,
electrode channel) and each patient across all trials when
irrational decisions were made and compared them to spec-
trograms when rational decisions were made. Specifically,
we examined spectral content before, during, and after the
player’s card was shown and implemented a non-parametric
cluster statistic to test whether the spectral activity differed
between rational and irrational decisions in the given brain
region. The non-parametric cluster test generates a cluster
defined by a set of adjacent time-frequency windows that
gives rise to the smallest p-value. If this p-value is smaller
than 0.05, then the brain region (defined by location of
the channel) was designated as encoding information about
(ir)rationality.
We found that upon examining several brain regions in
cognitive, limbic and hippocampal networks, the precuneus
encoded information that separated rational decisions from
irrational decisions. Specifically, when high-frequency ac-
tivity (HFA), defined as 70–100 Hz, was prevalent in this
region, then the player was more likely to make an irrational
978-1-4577-0220-4/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE 3406
TABLE I
THIS TABLE PROVIDES CLINICALLY RELEVANT INFORMATION ON EACH
SUBJECT: THE GENDER, THE AGE IN YEARS, AND THE DURATION OF
EPILEPSY (“DUR.”) IN YEARS. THIS TABLE ALSO PROVIDES THE






1 male 26 3 142 1
2 female 41 38 122 1
3 female 55 52 41 12
4 female 31 13 98 12
5 female 60 8 138 1
6 female 36 36 120 12
7 female 23 5 87 22
8 female 32 13 120 1
9 male 28 11 144 4
decision after he/she sees his card. The precuneus has been
implicated in risk-related decision making [6], but no study
has had access to electrical activity from this region at a
millisecond time-scale. Hence, these findings are the first to
show evidence of temporal dynamics of rhythms at a fine
resolution when decisions are made. Possible therapies may




At the Cleveland Clinic, patients with medically in-
tractable epilepsy routinely undergo SEEG recordings in
order to localize the seizure focus. In this study, aside
from the behavioral experiments, no alterations were made
to the patient’s clinical care, including the placement of
the electrodes [7]. Subjects enrolled voluntarily and gave
informed consent under criterion approved by the Cleveland
Clinic Institutional Review Board. A total of nine subjects
volunteered to perform the task. Details on these recordings
and eventual annotated seizure focus of these nine patients
are noted in Table I.
Subjects were implanted with 8 to 13 depth electrodes. Im-
plantation was performed using robot-assisted surgery along
with co-registered functional MRIs and angiograms to ensure
safe implantation [8]. Once inserted, SEEG electrophysio-
logical data were acquired using a Nihon Kohden 1200 EEG
diagnostic and monitoring system (Nihon Kohden America,
USA) at a sampling rate of 1 kHz or 2 kHz. Behavioral event
data were simultaneously acquired through the MonkeyLogic
MATLAB® toolbox [9].
B. Stereoelectroencephalography
The innovative approach using SEEG methodology relies
on its capability in accessing large-scale networks, providing
precise human brain data, from cortical to subcortical areas,
in a three-dimensional fashion. In routine placement of depth
electrodes, burr-holes that are each 15 mm in diameter are
required for safe visualization of cortical vessels, and there-
fore only a small number of electrodes are placed. SEEG
A B
Fig. 1. Imaging fusion and placement of multiple electrodes using the
SEEG method. Fig. A is a photograph showing 14 electrodes at the skin
surface. Fig. B is a fluoroscopy image of an SEEG-implanted subject
(coronal view with eye forward). Note the precise parallel placement, with
tips terminating at the midline or dural surface.
placement, however, uses several small drill holes (1.8 mm
in diameter), allowing many electrodes to be inserted.
Since direct visualization of the cortical surface is not
possible with small drills (Fig. 1A–B), the SEEG technique
may require detailed pre-procedural vascular mapping using
pre-operative imaging with magnetic resonance angiography
(MRA) and cerebral angiography. Angiography is an X-ray
examination of the blood vessels. The mapping procedure is
performed under fluoroscopy using general anesthesia, and
an expert neuro-anesthesiologist correctly titrates anesthesia
to permit measurement of intracranial EEG. The number and
location of implanted electrodes are pre-operatively planned
based on a hypothesis, which is formulated in accordance
with non-invasive pre-implantation data such as seizure
semiology, ictal and inter-ictal scalp EEG, MRI images,
PET and ictal single-photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) scans. Thus, the implantation strategy has the goal
of accepting or rejecting the pre-implantation hypothesis of
the location of the epileptogenic zone (EZ).
SEEG provides a complete coverage of the brain, from
lateral, intermediate and/or deep structures in a three-
dimensional arrangement recorded over hundreds of chan-
nels. Using strict techniques, this procedure is safe and
minimally invasive [10], [11].
C. Gambling task
Subjects performed the gambling task in their Epilepsy
Monitoring Unit room. The task was displayed via a com-
puter screen and the subject interacted with the task using
an InMotion2 robotic manipulandum (Interactive Motion
Technologies, USA). The manipulandum is controlled by
the subject’s hand and allows for 2D planar motion, which
translated directly to the position of a cursor on screen.
The gambling task (Fig. 2A) is based on a simple game
of high card where subjects would win virtual money if their
card beat the computer’s card. Specifically, in the beginning
of each trial, the subject controlled a cursor via a planar
manipulandum to a fixation target. Afterwards, the subject is
shown his card (2, 4, 6, 8, or 10) that is randomly chosen
with equal distribution (subjects are given the distribution of
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Fig. 2. Gambling task and behavioral results. (A) Timeline of the behavioral
task. After fixation, subjects were shown their card. Once the bets were
shown, subjects selected one of the choices and then were shown the
computer’s card following a delay. Feedback was provided afterwards by
displaying the amount won or lost. (B) Average bet decisions across cards.
Subjects predominantly bet low for 2 and 4 cards and bet high for 8 and 10
cards. There was no predominant strategy for 6 cards, which had bout 33 %
chance of eliciting a high bet. (C) Reaction times across cards. Subjects
reacted faster for cards whose rewards had lower variability.
cards a priori). The computer’s card is initially hidden. The
screen then shows their two choices: a high bet ($20) or a
low bet ($5). The subject has 6 seconds to select one with
his cursor. Following selection, the computer’s card, which
follows the same distribution, is revealed. The final screen
depicts the amount won or lost.
D. Data analysis
All electrophysiological and behavioral analyses were con-
ducted offline using custom MATLAB® scripts.
Data for electrodes in the precuneus structure were sep-
arated into rational and irrational trials. A rational trial is
defined as a trial in which the subject bets low on a 2- or
4-card, or bets high on a 8- or 10-card, thus maximizing
the expected reward conditioned on their card. On the other
hand, an irrational trial is defined as a trial in which the
subject bets high on a 2- or 4-card, or bets low on a 8- or
10-card. Trials in which the subject receives a 6-card are
ignored.
Differences in the neural responses between the task
conditions during the 250 ms before and 750 ms after show
card were examined by means of a non-parametric cluster
statistic. Specifically, spectrograms were constructed for each
trial time-locked to when the player’s card is shown. Then the
spectrograms for rational trials were compared to those for
irrational trials. To see if spectrograms for each group were
statistically significantly different, we used a nonparametric
cluster-based test [12]. Clusters are defined as a set of adja-
cent time-frequency windows whose activity is statistically
significant between trials where the subject ends up betting
rationally versus irrationally.
1) Spectral analysis: We calculated the oscillatory power
using multitapers from the Chronux toolbox [13]. We used
three orthogonal tapers with a 300 ms window sliding at
50 ms steps. We dropped frequencies under 10 Hz because
of the Rayleigh criterion and analyzed upwards to 100 Hz.
Afterwards, we normalize each frequency bin’s power by
first taking the natural log of the power in each frequency
bin, and then performing a Gaussian normalization based on
the power in each frequency bin over the entire recording
session.
2) Non-parametric cluster statistical test: Significant dif-
ferences between the neural response data in each anatomical
region are defined by a non-parametric cluster statistic run
on data aggregated from trials by all relevant subjects [12].
This test leverages the dependency between adjacent time-
frequency windows in order to avoid over-penalizing with
multiple comparison corrections. For each time-frequency
window in the spectrogram, a null distribution was created
by shuffling these rational and irrational bet labels 1000
times between trials within each subject. Within each shuffle,
the average difference between the newly labeled rational
and irrational bet spectrograms was calculated. A p-value
was assigned for each window by comparing the difference
acquired from the true labels with the distribution of differ-
ences acquired from the shuffled labels. Clusters were formed
by grouping windows with significant p-values (p < 0.05)
that were adjacent in either time or frequency. The test
statistic for each cluster was calculated by taking the sum
of the log of the p-values for each window in the cluster.
This prioritizes clusters that both have strong differences as
well as large sizes. A null distribution of cluster statistics
was created using the same process but with the 1000
spectrograms obtained from the originally shuffled labels.
The observed cluster statistic was then compared against this
null distribution of cluster statistics in order to obtain the final
p-value of the test.
3) High-frequency activity: The high-frequency activity
(HFA) metric captures high gamma activity and reflects pre-
vious work in SEEG [14] and other invasive recordings. HFA
includes the average of all normalized log-power frequency
bins between 70 and 100 Hz at each time point.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section summarizes the main findings of our analysis.
First, we show the cluster analyses performed on precuneus
neural data. Then, we show time-frequency differences of
the neural responses around the show card epoch.
While multiple brain regions appear to show some re-
sponse (data not shown), the two task conditions only signif-
icantly differ after show card in precuneus (p < 0.001). The
p-value was computed from a non-parametric cluster statistic
described in Section II.
Differences in the neural responses around the show card
was examined for precuneus (Fig. 3). Spectrograms of the
neural responses between rational and irrational conditions
show large differences in the high frequencies after the show
card. We summarize the neural activity in the time-frequency
domain by averaging the responses over 70–100 Hz. This
high-frequency activity increases more for irrational trials in































Fig. 3. Differences in the neural responses during the 250 ms before and
750 ms after the show card for precuneus. (First and second rows) Spec-
trograms of the neural responses show differences in the time-frequency
domain between rational and irrational conditions. (Third row) Clusters
emphasize the region of the time-frequency domain where the neural
responses show significant differences (p < 0.05). (Fourth row) High-
frequency activity (70–100 Hz) increases after the show card for irrational
trials while it doesn’t modulate significantly for rational trials. Shaded error
bars represent 1 standard error.
The precuneus is a structure located just above the cuneate
lobe (in the parietal lobe) of the brain, near the juncture be-
tween the two hemispheres. The precuneus is interconnected
to a variety of brain structures, making it integral to many
systems. Consequently, the precuneus is involved in many
functions generating complex human behaviors, including
episodic memory, visual-spatial abilities, motor control, self
perception, consciousness, and the executive and working
memory.
Interestingly, the precuneus is responsible for allowing
people to evaluate themselves, rating personality and physical
traits. Its self-reflection allows comparisons to be made
between the self and others, and informs societal behavior. A
recent fMRI study suggested that the precuneus is involved
in “reasoning in the social world” [15] and rationality.
The authors use the definition of rationality proposed by
“communicative action theory” [16], where rationality refers
to interpersonal communication rather than to a knowing sub-
ject. They showed that the precuneus, among other regions,
activated during communicative reasoning.
In our subject population, the neural activity in the
precuneus modulated significantly between rational and ir-
rational trials (p < 0.001). In particular, high-frequency
activity increased after the show card for irrational trials.
Such high frequency temporal dynamics cannot be observed
with fMRI, yet decisions are made at such a fine temporal
scale.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our findings suggest that the precuneus
should be taken into account in decision-making studies for
examining the role of rationality as defined by maximizing a
utility function such as the expected reward. Still, the exact
mechanism by which the precuneus is involved in decision
making is not known and will therefore remains the focus
of future work.
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